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This paper is an explanation of how the intentionality of perception is due to specific 
associations of sensations. It describes the intentionality of the mental and the prob-
lem that intentionality poses for accounts of the mind. The concept of "direction of 
fit" or "fulfillment of the act" is central to this description. An amalgamation of vari-
ous recent interpretations of intentionality into a unified theory is presented along 
with an account of why even such a unified theory fails to account for direction of fit. 
The direction of fit of perceptual intentionality is then elucidated as a function of pat-
terns of association of sensations. Objections to this associational manner of conceiv-
ing of intentionality are responded to and evidence in support of the overall 
conception is provided. The paper concludes with a brief explanation of how this 
characterization of direction of fit applies to other domains of mental activity that 
exhibit intentionality. 
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Recent endeavors to explain the intentionality of the mental have met 
with a good measure of success. Thinkers in past decades have regarded the 
apparent intractability of efforts to give an extensional interpretation to the 
intensional linguistic idiom as evidence for the trans-natural ontological 
status of the mind (Geach, 1977, pp. 26-28; for a recent die-hard defender of 
this notion that intentionality is transcendent viz. Haldane, 1996, 1997). 
Others have regarded this difficulty as grounds for simply excluding alto-
gether the propositional attitudes from scientific accounts of reality (Quine, 
1976a, 1976b). Philosophers of cognitive science who have actually made 
progress in articulating sophisticated descriptions and explanations of inten-
tionality include Kenneth Sayre, Fred Dretske, Ruth Millikan, John Searle, 
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Jerrold Fodor and Patricia and Paul Churchland. Dretske and Sayre articu-
lated the foundations of this account in their conceptualizations of the mind 
in terms of information theory (Dretske, 1981; Sayre, 1976). Milikan 
extended this basic conception through her explication of the evolutionary 
origin and function of the intentional relation (Milikan, 1984). Searle and 
Fodor have enriched the understanding of the causal element in intentional-
ity (Fodor, 1987; Searle, 1983). And the Churchlands have coordinated this 
evolutionary- causal-information theoretic explanation of intentionality 
with functionalist theories of the mind (Churchland, 1988; Churchland and 
Churchland, 1998). Though these researchers have not regarded their efforts 
as being in consort, their accounts can be consolidated into a rich concep-
tion that comprehends many aspects of perceptual intentionality 
(Haugeland, 1990, provides an excellent overview of such a consolidation). 
However, even this amalgamated conceptualization suffers a defect - an 
essential aspect of the intentional relation is not captured. This paper both 
exposes and remedies this lacuna. Part one of the paper is a description of the 
general concept of intentionality and distinctive features of perceptual inten-
tionality, with especial attention to "direction of fit" in acts of perception. It 
also includes a characterization of how the causal aspect of perception is con-
tained within the very act of perceiving and thereby constitutes this direc-
tion of fit. The second part comprises a survey and consolidation of various 
attempts at explicating the nature of intentionality and an elucidation of 
how even this amalgam fails to explain direction of fit. The third and crucial 
part of the paper contains the explanation of how direction of fit in visual 
perception is a function of very specific complexes of associations of visual 
and tactile sensations. The upshot of this explanation is that the intentional 
perceiving of a thing occurs whenever the associational pattern of sensations 
that is caused by the thing has the same form as the causal relation between 
the thing perceived and the sensations that it causes. Part four comprises 
brief consideration of objections to and evidence for this way of explaining 
perceptual intentionality. The final part of the paper considers how the 
account of intentional direction of fit in terms of association patterns could 
be extrapolated to other domains of mental activity that exhibit object 
directedness. 
The Intentionality of the Mental 
Many states and acts of the mind are intentional or representational. If a 
mental activity possesses intentionality then it is about something, refers to or 
relates to some thing which is different from the act itself (Smith and Mcintyre, 
1982, chapter III, section 1.3 ). Instances of different types of representa-
tional activities would be looking at the bell in the distant tower, listening to 
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the bell pealing, remembering seeing that bell in the past, imagining seeing it 
again in the future, thinking it is the largest bell in the city, wanting to hear 
it toll the hour, intending to discover more about that bell. States of mind 
that are intentional or representative are brought into being and maintained 
in being through such mental acts (Armstrong, 1968, pp. 130-131). For 
instance, looking produces a sighting of the bell in the distance, listening 
results in the hearing of it peal, remembering causes a memory of seeing it, 
imagining brings about an image of it, thinking produces a thought of it, 
intending culminates in an intention, wanting produces a state of wanting, 
etc. Though acts of mind and the mental states they produce, that are in 
respect of or apropos something other than themselves, are obviously quite 
common in the life of the psyche, not all acts/states of mind are intentional. 
For example, the "raw" sensations out of which perceptual representations 
are constituted are not about something distinct from themselves. Such rela-
tively unstructured sensory presentations, though themselves a product of 
mental activity, gain "aboutness" through the further mental activity of being 
re-presented (or re-configured, re-arrayed) as a thing in the environment. 
Hence, a perceptual representation is of (in a non-intentional sense) the sen-
sations that constitute it - the re-presenting is the re-ordering of those sen-
sations. In an intentional sense, a perceptual representation is of a thing that 
is outside the mind. 1 The problem of the intentionality of the mental is pre-
cisely the problem of how such re-presenting gives object directedness to 
non-intentional presentations. Descartes and the Port Royal logicians who 
followed him in his "new way of ideas" regarded representation as an unana-
lyzable given or brute fact about ideas ( Donagan, 1988; Gewirth, 194 3). 
Contemporary philosophers of cognitive science are attempting to analyze 
and explain the workings of precisely this feature of the mental. Whatever 
may be the scope of the representational with respect to acts and states of 
mind, analyzing intentionality has proven to be particularly difficult due, in 
the first place, to the simple fact that intentionality is a relational property. 
Relations are odd sorts of entities. According to traditional substance 
metaphysics, the relational property itself is to be distinguished from the 
"subject" of the relation, which is a substance standing in relation to the 
"term" of the relation, which is (a property of) some other substance. Hence, 
relations themselves fall within the metaphysical category of accident and 
10ther states of mind that are not intentional in this sense, that do not gain intentionality 
through their components being re-presented in such ways include moods and deep medita-
tive trances (Q. Smith, 1981). It is worth noting that not all intentional states are also con-
scious states of mind. People still have beliefs about the world and intentions to reform it 
while they are fast asleep. The problem of the intentionality of the mental is not the same 
problem as the problem of consciousness. 
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accordingly have no being of their own, i.e., they depend for their existence 
on that of which they are a property (Wild, 1948, chapter 15, section 8, pro-
vides a modern gloss of this analysis). Intentional relations are doubly odd in 
that they can obtain between the subject of the relation and a "thing" that 
does not have real, i.e., extra-mental, existence. 
Much has been made of this unusual feature of intentionality and much 
has been written about it (Brentano, 1874/1973, and Chisholm, 1967, are 
centerpieces; see also McAlister, 1976). I can hallucinate seeing and hearing 
a bell, I can think that unicorns are difficult to ride, I can believe that the 
fifth decimal determination of pi is two, I can remember visiting Ankor Wat, 
etc. Nonetheless, it seems that both the things that are related to each other 
and the features by which they are related must exist in order for any relation 
to exist since, as an accident, the being of a relation is utterly derivative from 
the being of what is related. It is this anomaly, that intentional relations are 
an exception to the rule that relations can obtain between physical things 
only if both the subject and the term actually exist, that seems to pose an 
insurmountable obstacle to conceiving the mind entirely in physical terms. 
In fact, Brentano employed this feature of intentional relations as the demar-
cation criterion between a realm of the physical and a realm of the mental 
(Brentano, 1874/1973, pp. 88-89). Other philosophers have been led by this 
aspect of intentionality to posit a trans-natural ontological status to the 
minds that are the subjects of such relations (Chisholm, 1967; and again, 
Haldane, 1996, 1997). 
Be this as it may, both naturalistic and non-naturalistic attempts to explain 
how intentional relations can obtain with the non-existent make critical use 
of distinctions between the content of mental activities, the mental objects to 
which such activities are directed via this content and the extra-mental things 
which usually correspond to these mental objects (Gurwitsch, 1967, esp. pp. 
127-131; see Smith and Mcintyre, 1982, for an excellent correlating of 
Husserl's phenomenological analysis of this content/object distinction with 
Frege's semantical analysis of the same). Though different authors assign 
somewhat different meanings to these terms the general idea is as follows: 
the content of the mental activity is the form or pattern of the act, the spe-
cific order in which it occurs. Such an activity is goal directed and the end 
toward which it tends is (the beginning of) a mental state that is maintained 
in being by the continuance of that activity. This activity is ordered in such 
a manner by its content to result in a highly structured stable state - the 
structure of the constituting activity structures the state. An intentional 
state of mind then is the ongoing state of this tendential mental activity. 
Such activity is intentional precisely in the sense that it tends toward, has as 
its objective, is oriented to as to its end, this determinate state. More specifi-
cally, such activity consists in the re-presenting, re-configuring, re-arraying 
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or re-ordering of simple qualitative components. 2 These lower level compo-
nents are not themselves intentional. At the higher levels of functional scale 
the activity of re-presenting these simple qualitative presentations is directed 
to and completed in a specific end state. And it is this terminal state that is 
the representation of an extra-mental thing. Be it noted that these terminal 
representational states are not things that exist independently of the re-
presenting activity - they are maintained in existence precisely by ongoing 
contentful mental activity by which they are brought into existence in the 
first place. 3 
For example, the constituting activity of perceptual states is the re-ordering 
or re-arranging, etc. of simple sensory qualitative sensations into a thing that is 
causing that activity, i.e., into a representation of whatever it is that is bringing 
about the representing act. My seeing of the bell is constituted out of visual 
sensings and the content of that constituting is the specific patterning of those 
shapes and colors. This reconfiguring results in a visual representation of the 
bell. My hearing of the bell is the re-configuring of pitches at intensities that 
results in an auditory representation of the bell. Different types of perceptions 
are simply specific orderings of qualitatively distinct types of sensings. 
In short, the intentionality of perceptual mental activity is this relation 
between content of mental act (pattern of reconfiguring activity) and mental 
object of act (completed reconfiguration). Thus, and strictly speaking, the 
intentional relation does not obtain immediately between a subject sub-
stance and a feature of some other substance, but between an activity of the 
subject and a state (of the subject) produced by that activity. In terms of 
traditional substance ontologies, then, this relation holds between two 
accidents of the same substance ( cf. Chisholm's analysis of intentionality, 
1967; see also Kim, 1997, and Manfredi and Summerfield, 1997). However, 
in any analysis of intentionality carried out within the parameters of a realist 
ontology, representing activity actually does intend some extra-mental reality 
(Deely, 1982, contains an exhaustive and exhausting overview of medieval 
realist semantics; Sayre, 1997, contains a contemporary rendition). According 
to realist conceptions, a mental state maintained by ongoing re-presenting 
activity perceptually represents an extra-mental thing insofar as that state (of 
2These qualitative components of the intentional mental act may in turn consist of configura-
tions of (qualitative) elements at a lower level of scale. This reductive procession, of complex 
patternings of simple elements that are themselves complexes of simples, ends at a lowest 
level of functional scale of mental activity the content of which consists in patterns of irre-
ducible (in consciousness) qualities (the Church lands, 1998, essay II, argue the definitive 
case for this conception). 
3Hence, the object is said to have "inexistence" or existence in the intentional activity of the 
mind (Spiegelberg, 1976, for explication of "intentional inexistence;" but Marras, 1976, and 
Sorabji, 1991, strongly criticize Spiegelberg's explanation). 
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reconfigured sensations) corresponds to that thing or to some set of its proper-
ties.4 The intentionality of the activity reaches through, as it were, the 
mental state to the extra-mental reality because and to the extent that the 
state correlates with that real thing. An illuminating analogy is the painting 
by an artist of a portrait of a person. The act of painting is a re-arranging of 
paints (re-presenting) that is ordered by its form (the content of the activity) 
to the completed portrait (object of the activity) of the person (the real 
thing that the representation represents). The portrait is of a real individual 
only insofar as there is some measure of correspondence between the way in 
which the paints are arrayed on the canvas and features of the person. The 
analogy would be closer to what occurs in perception if the portrait could 
only be maintained in being by continuous painting activity. In any event, a 
mental act that enjoys such correspondence thereby mediately refers to an 
extra-mental reality and an intentional relation obtains between a feature of 
one substance and (a feature of) some other substance. However, it obtains 
in this way only in veridical intentional states. 
If I really do see the bell in the distant tower, the re-presenting of my 
visual sensations is directed upon and maintains a state (configuring of visual 
sense qualities) that really does correspond closely with a thing that really 
does exist independently of my mind and, accordingly, my seeing is of that 
thing. When the term of a mental act does not correlate with anything 
extra-mental then the intentional relation obtains only between content and 
object (act and state) within the mind. If I am hallucinating in "seeing" a 
4This correspondence was understood by Aristotle to be an identity relation between the 
knower and the known extra-mental entity (a "wide content" conception of representation). 
When a knower is conscious of (the properties of) some thing, then this identity relation is a 
formal isomorphism ~ a form instantiated within the soul or mind (the form of the body) is 
the same as the formal property existing outside the mind. Though this form is in the subject, 
it is not the form of the subject. It is carried in/by the mind as the form of an other (De 
Anima III, chapters IV and V). The whole problem of explaining intentionality is to explain 
how such a form is carried as the form of something else. Contemporary cognitive scientific 
interpretations of the mind's activity in information theoretic terms employ essentially this 
Aristotelian conception (Sayre, 1976, and Dretske, 1981, are quite explicit about this; cf. 
Dechert, 1965, for an account of the relation between Aristotle's formal cause and Shannon's 
information theory; see also D.M. Mackay, 1980). It is important to note that the isomor· 
phism between mental states and real things admits of degree. Mental objects correspond more 
or less with things outside the mind. The measure of this correspondence would be subject to 
selection~ only as much isomorphism between objects and realities as would be needed to behave 
effectively vis-a-vis those realities would be selected for over the evolutionary history of any type of 
cognitive organism. Hence, organisms are aware of, bear information about, only select properties 
of the entities that matter most to them. It is also worth noting that, with respect to this concep· 
tion of intentionality, the real things mental activities are about could be physical entities in the 
immediate environs of the conscious organism or Platonic noetically existing universals. With 
respect to theories of mind, realism entails that the objects of mental activities (can) correspond 
with and therefore be about entities that exist independently of those mental acts, whether those 
extra-mental things have physical or immaterial ontological status. 
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bell in a distant tower, the representing activity terminates in a state (the 
same kind of state as in the veridical case) to which no extra-mental reality 
corresponds. Hence, whatever it is that I am conscious of when I hallucinate, 
it is not an extra-mental thing- I am not (really) seeing any thing. Analo-
gously, a concave mirror in a carnival fun-house makes me attend to a dis-
torted image of my body. I am aware of the image - I am not seeing my real 
body. However, when I look into the bathroom mirror to ascertain whether 
or not I have cut my face and I see blood on my face then the object of my 
seeing activity really is the blood on my face. I am aware of the blood and 
not of an image. When a subject is aware of the fact that the object of her 
mental act does not agree with extra-mental reality, that mental object itself 
can become the object of other higher order acts of mind. Such reflection 
serves the purpose of bringing about concordance between the object of the 
lower order act of mind and the extra-mental thing. The upshot of all this, in 
terms of metaphysical realism, is that intentional relations with the non-
existent obtain only in the sense that patterns of mental activity terminate 
in a (mental) state to which no extra-mental thing corresponds. Non-veridi-
cal intending is only this relation that obtains between mental activity (re-
presenting) and mental state (representation). Now, in both veridical and 
non-veridical representational states, the content of the mental activity pro-
ducing that state must be directed to its object in the proper manner. 
This directing of the act (with its content) onto the state (which is the 
immediate object) is referred to, in the phenomenological tradition, as "ful-
fillment" or "satisfaction" of the mental act and, in the analytic tradition, as 
"direction of fit" of the act (Searle, 1983, passim, and 1998, pp. 100-106). 
Speaking metaphorically from a first person perspective, in perception the 
world is experienced as streaming into my self, the subject of perceptual 
mental activities. Searle characterizes this tendential vectoring in perception 
as follows: 
... perception is an intentional and causal transaction between mind and the world. 
The direction of fit is mind-to-world, the direction of causation is world-to-mind and 
they are not independent, for fit is achieved only if the fit is caused by the other term 
of the relation of fitting, namely the state of affairs perceived. ( 1983, p. 49) 
The thing outside my mind in fact causes my perceiving, instead of some-
thing else causing some other mental activity, and the thing causes my per-
ceiving of it, rather than of something else. If that thing did not cause me to 
perceive it then I would simply perceive something else or not perceive any-
thing at all. Furthermore, the thing perceived is perceived as causing its per-
ception, as effectuating the perception of it. If one was not conscious of the 
thing perceived as causing one to perceive it then either it would appear 
in/to consciousness as the effect of mental activities (as do the objects of 
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ties.4 The intentionality of the activity reaches through, as it were, the 
mental state to the extra-mental reality because and to the extent that the 
state correlates with that real thing. An illuminating analogy is the painting 
by an artist of a portrait of a person. The act of painting is a re-arranging of 
paints (re-presenting) that is ordered by its form (the content of the activity) 
to the completed portrait (object of the activity) of the person (the real 
thing that the representation represents). The portrait is of a real individual 
only insofar as there is some measure of correspondence between the way in 
which the paints are arrayed on the canvas and features of the person. The 
analogy would be closer to what occurs in perception if the portrait could 
only be maintained in being by continuous painting activity. In any event, a 
mental act that enjoys such correspondence thereby mediately refers to an 
extra-mental reality and an intentional relation obtains between a feature of 
one substance and (a feature of) some other substance. However, it obtains 
in this way only in veridical intentional states. 
If I really do see the bell in the distant tower, the re-presenting of my 
visual sensations is directed upon and maintains a state (configuring of visual 
sense qualities) that really does correspond closely with a thing that really 
does exist independently of my mind and, accordingly, my seeing is of that 
thing. When the term of a mental act does not correlate with anything 
extra-mental then the intentional relation obtains only between content and 
object (act and state) within the mind. If I am hallucinating in "seeing" a 
4This correspondence was understood by Aristotle to be an identity relation between the 
knower and the known extra-mental entity (a "wide content" conception of representation). 
When a knower is conscious of (the properties of) some thing, then this identity relation is a 
formal isomorphism ~ a form instantiated within the soul or mind (the form of the body) is 
the same as the formal property existing outside the mind. Though this form is in the subject, 
it is not the form of the subject. It is carried in/by the mind as the form of an other (De 
Anima III, chapters IV and V). The whole problem of explaining intentionality is to explain 
how such a form is carried as the form of something else. Contemporary cognitive scientific 
interpretations of the mind's activity in information theoretic terms employ essentially this 
Aristotelian conception (Sayre, 1976, and Dretske, 1981, are quite explicit about this; cf. 
Dechert, 1965, for an account of the relation between Aristotle's formal cause and Shannon's 
information theory; see also D.M. Mackay, 1980). It is important to note that the isomor· 
phism between mental states and real things admits of degree. Mental objects correspond more 
or less with things outside the mind. The measure of this correspondence would be subject to 
selection~ only as much isomorphism between objects and realities as would be needed to behave 
effectively vis-a-vis those realities would be selected for over the evolutionary history of any type of 
cognitive organism. Hence, organisms are aware of, bear information about, only select properties 
of the entities that matter most to them. It is also worth noting that, with respect to this concep· 
tion of intentionality, the real things mental activities are about could be physical entities in the 
immediate environs of the conscious organism or Platonic noetically existing universals. With 
respect to theories of mind, realism entails that the objects of mental activities (can) correspond 
with and therefore be about entities that exist independently of those mental acts, whether those 
extra-mental things have physical or immaterial ontological status. 
ASSOCIATION MECHANISMS 97 
bell in a distant tower, the representing activity terminates in a state (the 
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ception, as effectuating the perception of it. If one was not conscious of the 
thing perceived as causing one to perceive it then either it would appear 
in/to consciousness as the effect of mental activities (as do the objects of 
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imagining) or as neither the cause nor as the effect of mental action (as do 
no objects of awareness). Both of these possibilities contradict the phe-
nomenology of perception and the phenomenal differences between perceiv-
ing and other types of mental activities. Hence, a perceptual representation 
befits a real thing and the real relation between it and the mental activity 
that it causes only if the fact that the thing is causing the organism to repre-
sent it is somehow contained within the representation. This means that not 
only must the mental object be coincident with the real thing in order for 
the mental act to reach through the mental object and refer to a real thing, 
but the mental object must be coincident with the very relation between the 
extra-mental thing and mental activity that it causes. In this way, the direct-
ing of the mental activity by its content upon its specific object (which is, 
again, the terminal state maintained by the activity) accomplishes reference 
to the real thing causing that activity as to its cause. 5 And, this is how a form 
in the knower is carried as the form of some thing other than the knower. 
Note that this does not mean that sensations are consciously categorized (or 
schematized or framed) as being in such causal relations. The form of the 
cause-effect relation is simply contained within the very object of mental 
activity. Thus it is that intentional states of mind can be brought about in 
creatures that are aware of their environs yet have no concept of causality. 
Adult humans become aware of the fact of direction of fit, and of intention-
ality as such, only in higher-order reflection on lower-order intentional states 
(more of this later). 
Perception is veridical when mind-to-world direction of fit obtains because 
the mental act is fitted to its object as to its cause and a real thing actually 
causes the act. Misperception will occur when mental activity which still has 
content directing it upon an object as upon its cause, either is not brought 
about by a real thing (with which the mental object would be isomorphic 
were it to exist) or is not brought about in the correct causal manner (the 
thing is present in the environs yet is not the cause of the ersatz perceptual 
mental activities). As an example of the first type, Macbeth sees the dagger 
before him and knows there is no dagger there to cause such visual sensations 
since he cannot touch it. For this reason he infers that something else is 
causing these visual sensations. A case of the second type of misperception 
would occur if I heard the phone ringing and it really was ringing though its 
5Cf. Kant's (1787 /1973, B 208, p. 201) explanation of the "anticipation of perception:" "Appearances 
contain in addition to intuition the matter for some object in general (whereby something exist-
ing in space and time is represented); they contain, that is to say, the real of sensation as merelY 
subjective representation, which gives us only the consciousness that the subject is affected, and which 
we relate to an object in general" (my emphasis). So, to the question, "What's it like to be an 
effect?" the response would be that "It is to bear a property that is directed upon a thing as the 
cause of that property, i.e., it is to bear a perceptual representation." 
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ringing was not causing those auditory sensations. In such a case I would not 
realize that something else was causing the ringing in my ears, unless, let us 
imagine, it continued after I picked up the phone. In both t'ypes of misper-
ception, one stilt perceives the hallucinated object as cause of the (hallucina-
tory) perception. In fact, direction of fit is precisely what accounts for 
hallucinated objects seeming to be so real and for hallucinating to be so dis-
turbing.6 
Direction of fit characterizes all types of intentional mental activities. By 
reflectively comparing the intentionality of different types of mental activi-
ties we become aware of direction of fit as such and come to realize that 
there are basically two different types of direction. In appetitive acts such as 
desiring or willing, the direction of fit, its tendential vectoring, is the reverse 
of what it is in perception. Again speaking metaphorically from the first 
person point of view, my own conative mental activities are experienced as 
streaming out into the world from me the subject of the activity. The world is 
made to fulfill the act, is being fitted to the act, and is so by the act (Donagan, 
1987, chapter five). The course of action I choose is brought about by my 
choosing instead of not choosing any action and by my choosing that specific 
course instead of some other. A volitive representation (a representation of 
an action that causes the action) befits this causal relation in the sense that 
the chosen behavior, what I choose to do, I choose as effectuated by my 
choice. "Phenomenally, the act of willing appears precisely not as an occur-
rence caused by a different agent but as an initial act of the ego-center itself" 
(Pfander, 1967; cf. Von Hildebrand, 1953, part two, section II). Hence, in 
volition, direction of fit means that the mental act (by its content) tends 
toward the object as to its effect. And this means that the choice or conative 
representation must be correspondent with the behaviors chosen and with the 
relation itself between those behaviors and the mental activity of choosing 
them. 7 In the case of a "deviant causal chain" (the parallel in volition to the 
6lntentionality is especially adaptive precisely because of direction of fit. Organisms capable of 
bearing states that have brought them into intentional relations with things outside of them-
selves (or with themselves) have been selected for over organisms that could not bear such 
states. Internal states which model the causal relationship between those very states and the 
things which cause them confer on their hearer the ability to become conscious of how things 
appear as such instead of merely being conscious of things in the environs. This in turn 
enables the bearer to alter how things appear instead of merely altering things and to be con-
scious of mis-perception as such. This then confers on the bearer the capacity to compensate 
for misperception. Accordingly, humans have constructed devices to correct for and greatly 
extend their own powers of sensation. 
7
To the question, "What's it like to be a cause?" the response would he "It is to bear a property 
that is directed upon a thing or behavior as upon the effect of that property, i.e., it is to bear a 
conative representation." Cf. Kant's (1798/1978, p. I 55) definition of desire as " ... the self 
definition of the power of a subject to imagine something in the future as an effect of such 
itnagination." 
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second type of perceptual misrepresentation noted in the preceding para-
graph) I still choose the action as the effect of my own choosing activity, i.e., 
behavior of mine initiated by me is the object of my choice. That is why the 
action seems to me to be my own. Nonetheless, when the cause of the behav-
ior is deviant the action does not actually occur by my choice and instead is 
caused by something else (Davidson, 1973; Donagan, 1987). 
All of these characteristics of the intentional relation can be summed up as 
follows. The intentionality of the mental consists essentially in the tenden-
tial directing of mental acts toward their objects which are the mental states 
sustained by those acts. When this end state corresponds to a real extra-
mental entity and to the causal relation between that thing and the activity 
sustaining the state then there is an intentional relation between that activ-
ity and the real thing. When there is no such real extra-mental entity or 
there is no such causal relation and yet the mental activity is directed toward 
the same end state that would result if there really were such an entity actu-
ally causing or being caused by that activity then the intentional relation 
obtains merely between the mental activity and that mental state. Specific 
patterns (contents) of re-presenting activities direct them into specific repre-
sentational end states (objects) and specify whether the intentional relation 
is passive, as in perception, or active, as in volition. It is worth noting that 
mental activities which have this content-object direction of fit constitute 
only part of the fundamental phenomenological structure of experience in 
general. Experience of an object is also always by a subject. The fact that rep-
resentational mental states are someone's, is the "subjectivity" of the mental. 
The general scheme of all experience then is as follows. 8 
engages a real 
the in a mental with a a mental extra-mental 
SUBJECT ACTIVITY -CONTENT- OBJECT--THING 
by which that may 
the act is or may not 
directed be coincident 
toward with 
8The subject pole of this structure has been variously interpreted, e.g., by Cartesians as an 
individuated disembodied substantial soul, by Humeans, Buddhists and some post-modernists 
as an illusion, by Kantians as merely phenomenal, by German Idealists as a transcendental 
ego. Aristotelians interpret the subject as an individual existing physical substance engaging 
in mental activities which are among its accidents and which are productive of its own inten-
tional states. This subject-substance is an ontological composite of formed-matter. Con-
temporary cognitive scientists combine the Kantian and Aristotelian interpretations. The 
phenomenal subject of experience is the representation of the very thing that is doing the rep-
resenting, i.e., is the model of the overall activity of a (human) nervous system that is caused 
by and carried within that very nervous system (Johnson-Laird, 1983 ). Very good phe-
nomenological analyses of subjectivity are in Crosby, 1996, chapter three, and Davis, 1989. 
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Examples of intentional acts such as those mentioned early in this section 
can be readily fitted into this scheme - "I" see the bell, "I" hear the bell, 
etc. The subject itself is brought into (intentional) relation with a real thing 
by the content of its own mental activity when the object of that act (or 
state of the subject) is sufficiently isomorphic with the thing. For instance, in 
visual perception the thing is sighted by the subject via complexes of her 
own visual sensory activities. The particular pattern of re-configured sensa-
tions is what moves the subject of those sensations to take them as the thing 
that causes them. 9 If such configurings of sensations occurred, without being 
"of a subject" (or without being of the proper type of subject) then they 
could still be representational and directed upon an object which was coinci-
dent with some extra-mental thing. Such an act and resulting state would 
just not be intentional for anyone (cf., Dretske, 1995, section 5). 
Recent Analyses of the Nature of Intentionality 
Over the last three decades cognitive scientists and philosophers have 
made real progress in elucidating the inner workings of intentionality. These 
researchers have tended to restrict their analyses to perceptual mental activi-
ties. Furthermore, they all emphasize different aspects of the intentional rela-
tion and consequently have all specified different requirements for a mental 
state to be intentional. In fact, a good portion of their efforts have consisted 
in attempts to find counterexamples to each other's postulated requirements. 
In other words, these researchers often try to characterize states that clearly 
are intentional yet lack the feature that some one of them has stipulated as 
necessary for intentionality. Or they characterize states that, though they 
possess this specified feature, are clearly not intentional (again, see 
Haugeland, 1990, for an overview). In spite of this disputational character of 
the research, the central tenets of these various approaches neatly complement 
one another and constitute, en masse, a rich explication of intentionality. In 
terms of the amalgamation of these conceptions, perceptual intentionality is 
at root a type of relation that obtains between (complex) physical systems. 
More specifically, in acts of perception the subject of the intentional relation 
is a pattern of nerve cell activity and the term of the relation is some thing 
91n semiotic terms, the subject of the sensations is the "interpretant," the configuration of sen-
sations is the "sign" and the thing that causes the sensations and is sighted via them is the 
"object." Associated sensations that function in this triadic manner are "dicentic indexical 
qualisigns" in Peirce's classification (Deely, 1982, pp. 93-106; Liszka, 1996, chapter 2). In 
scholastic terminology, the pattern of configured sensations is that by means of which (the id 
quo) the thing is seen by the subject and is not that which (the id quod) is seen by the subject 
(Marras, 1976). If the subject is hallucinating, the sensations are that which is seen, or more 
appropriately, that of which the subject is conscious (though not as hallucinatory, if she is 
unaware of the fact that she is hallucinating). 
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in the environment of the organism. Using concepts fundamental to the 
information theoretic conception of human psychology, Sayre characterized 
this basic relation as follows: 
In visual perception . . the relationship of intentionality is quite literally a relation-
ship of high mutual information between a set of objective circumstances and a repre-
sentation in the cortex of the perceiving system. The representation picks out that 
particular set of circumstances by virtue of its being the only object in the perceptual 
scene with which the representation shares that relationship. Through such a repre-
sentation the organism's perception is directed upon a specific object, which is thereby 
the object to which the representation refers. By sharing in its particular structure, the 
representation is true of the corresponding object. (Sayre, 1986, p. 136; cf. Sayre, 
1987) 
In brief, one state represents or is about another state only if there is a rela-
tion of high mutual information between the two states (a "wide content" con-
ception of meaning, if one state is of the nervous system and the other is of 
some entity outside the nervous system). In the mathematical theory of 
information, high mutual information obtains between two ensembles the 
elements of which are related by a set of conditional probabilities that are 
( 1) "deterministic," i.e., each element of an ensemble is uniquely related to 
an element of the other and (2) "absent equivocation" with respect to each 
other, i.e., each element is always related to the same element of the other. 
This mathematical refinement of Aristotle's notion of the formal cause is 
deployed here to explicate the correspondence relation between an inten-
tional mental/brain state and (properties of) the thing that the mental/brain 
state is about. 10 
In his further development of this externalist conception of meaning 
Dretske emphasized that information at a location is about information at 
some other specific location only so long as the correlation between the 
information at each is strong enough. There is some degree of informational 
correlation (formal isomorphism) between any two states of affairs. Dretske 
101t should he noted that high mutual information is only one way of more precisely explicat-
ing this correspondence between an intentional mental state and its extra-mental referent. 
Comparable conceptions in other branches of mathematics, presumably, could be used to 
explicate the relation in terms of parallelism of structure. For instance, in topology the rela-
tion between two geometrical forms is homeomorjJhic (they are topologically equivalent) if 
there is a function that maps all elements and relations between elements of one structure 
onto elements and relations between elements of the other. In set theory, two sets are ordinally 
equivalent if each member of a set can he matched to a member of the other set, the matching 
is one to one and the matching preserves the order among the elements. These are three dif-
ferent ways of specifying the relation between two wholes in terms of the totality of identity 
relations between the relations between their parts. In the most general sense then, an inten-
tional relation between a mental (or brain) state and some extra-mental reality is the totality 
of identities between the relations between components of the mental state and the relations 
between the components of that thing. 
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argued therefore that the correlation between the information at a structure 
in the nervous system and the information at a state of affairs in the envi-
ronment must be perfect in order for the neural state to be semantical or 
representational (but see note three). The strength of the correlation dis-
tinguishes the intentional relation from all other correlations (Dretske, 1981, 
chapter 3, "a semantic theory of information"). 
Fodor demonstrated that this relation of high mutual information between 
states must he of the proper causal sort in order for one state (of mind/brain) 
to be about the other (state of affairs in the environs). There may be high 
mutual information (perfect informational correlation) between a mental/ 
brain state and any number of other states of affairs. Thus, if such informa-
tional correlation sufficed for a mental state to refer then a state would be 
about each of the myriad of things with which it enjoyed high mutual infor-
mation. This came to be known as the "disjunction problem" - if correla-
tion alone sufficed for intentionality then a state 'M' that was about 'x' 
would also be about 'x or y' and about 'x or y or z', etc. since the correlation 
between 'M' and 'x' is the same as that between 'M' and 'x or y', etc. Fodor 
solved this problem by pointing out that an intentional relation obtains 
between highly correlated states only if one state is actuated or brought about 
or efficiently caused by the other. Without some such actual causal connec-
tion, any informational correlation could be entirely incidental, a mere coin-
cidence. Thus, a relation of efficient causality must overlay, as it were, the 
relation of high mutual information in order for a mental state to represent 
or to be about some other thing (Fodor, 1984, 1987). 
Millikan has drawn attention to the evolutionary origin and adaptive role of 
high mutual information between structures within an organism and the 
structures in its environment that cause them. In her terminology, the "stabi-
lizing proper function" of "inner terms" (or states of mind) is to bring their 
bearer into proper functional relations with external states. Inner terms 
acquire, over time and through mechanisms of selection, such functional 
effects for a type of organism. To put the point differently, a state within an 
organism is selected for insofar as ( 1) it has high mutual information with a 
specific state of the environment that causes it and (2) formal correlation 
and effectuation adapts the organism to the environmental state (and, of 
course, it is vital to the survival-unto-reproduction of the organism that it be 
so adapted) .11 Such behavioral adaptation occurs because the specific state of 
affairs in the environs causes the mental state to occur (efficiently), causes it 
to be the specific state that it is (formally), and because that mental state 
causes behavioral responses on the part of the organisms vis-a-vis the envi-
11 Millikan does not formulate her position in information theoretic terms, hut cf. Dretske, 
1981, chapter 9, and Sayre, 1976, pp. 239-243. 
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ronmental state of affairs. Selection occurs at each of these stages. So, those 
organisms will have fewer descendents which fail to be effectuated by that 
state of affairs or which, though they have mental/brain states caused by that 
state of affairs, have a lower information correlation with it or which, though 
they have high information correlation with the state of affairs in the envi-
rons, do not exhibit beneficial behaviors with respect to it. However, selec-
tion is never for the "best," but always only for what is marginally better. 
Consequently, there is "adaptational slippage" and inner states and correla-
tions and behaviors that are merely slightly more adaptive than others may 
be selected for (Papinau, 1993). Millikan's point is that a neural state can 
become intentional for an organism, i.e., an inner state can be about some 
external state of affairs, only after a sufficient measure of this functional adap-
tation has been achieved (Kappner, 1999; Millikan, 1984, chapter 6 on 
"intentional icons" and chapter 15 "the act of identifying"; Papineau, 1984). 
The Churchlands importantly contributed to the understanding of repre-
sentation in their attempt to explain intentionality entirely in terms of the 
functional role of mental acts and states vis-a-vis other mental acts and states 
of mind. As Paul Church land (1988) succinctly explains this "functional 
semantics": 
... purely physical states such as brain states might possess propositional content, and 
hence display intentionality. Having content or meaning, it seems, is just a matter of 
playing a specific role in a complex referential/computational economy . . The first 
[lesson] is the idea that since meaning arises from an item's place in a network of 
assumptions, and from the resulting conceptual role that the item plays in the system's 
ongoing inferential economy, therefore our mental states can have the propositional 
contents they do because of nothing more than their intricate relational features. (pp. 
63, 66) 
Such is the essential element in all internalist or "narrow content" concep-
tions of meaning. The intentionality of the mental is its internal functionality 
- a mental act is referential in that it produces a state of mind that brings 
about other acts/states of mind and is itself brought about by other acts/ 
states. What a representational state is specifically about is simply the spe-
cific set of other acts which the (representative) state leads to. 
Since none of these narrow or wide conceptions of meaning seems to be 
sufficient by itself to characterize the intentional relation, it seems reason-
able to attempt to combine them. Such an amalgamation of the requirements 
on perceptual representation would run as follows: 
A state or activity of an organism is about a thing in its environs if high mutual infor-
mation obtains between that state and the thing, the state is caused to occur by that 
thing via the mediation of other activities within the organism and the state leads to 
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further inner states of the organism that in turn lead it to behave adaptively with 
respect to the thing. liZ] 
A major problem with conceiving intentionality in these terms has been 
the explanation of failure of reference. In what sense does an intentional 
relation so understood obtain between mental/neural states and some thing 
that does not exist? A man suffering delirium tremens hallucinates in seeing 
the mouse in the plasma bottle suspended above his hospital bed. His seeing 
is surely intentional, yet his inner state surely does not have high mutual 
information with any thing in the environment. Dretske articulated the 
obvious explanation -failure of reference occurs because the state occurring 
in the organism, though normally brought about by and highly correlated 
with something in the environs, on this occasion has not been brought about 
by that thing (Dretske, 1981; Fodor, 1987, proffers a similar account). The 
high mutual information between a thing and some state in the organism 
that the thing usually causes is built up over a period of time. Dretske calls 
this the "learning period." It spans a segment of the life of the individual or, 
as Millikan would add, of the life of the species. When the learning period is 
completed, then, the efficient causal action of the thing on the sense organs 
results in the occurrence of a state within the organism which enjoys high 
mutual information with an environmental state of affairs. However, if some-
thing else efficiently causes the state within the organism when that thing is 
not present in the environment acting on the organism then the organism 
will behave in the same way it does when it is actually present in the envi-
rons. On such an occasion, though an information state in the organism has 
been brought into being by some thing, that state does not have high mutual 
12ln contradistinction to this individualistic interpretation of intentionality, some philoso-
phers have argued for a social understanding of intentionality. Haugeland cites Martin 
Heidegger and Wilfred Sellars as modern proponents of this Kantian idea that certain social 
practices arc needed to make mental states be about environmental states of affair - Kant 
defines objectivity as intersubjective or universal validity (Burge, 1979; Dummett, 1974; 
Haugeland, 1990). This can be understood simply as extending the functional role of states of 
the organism to include functional relations between them and the internal states of other 
organisms. The high mutual information that constitutes the basis of the intentional relation 
Would then obtain between the inner state of an individual and some thing in the environ-
ment only if that inner state were properly related to the inner states of other individuals. For 
example, an individual monkey is set to chattering in a certain way when something in its 
environment causes certain visual sensations, yet it sees the leopard only when it hears enough 
of its neighboring monkeys chattering in that same way (i.e., as caused in them by the same 
Sort of visual sensations). The individual monkey's internal state is a representation of the 
leopard only insofar as that state is functionally connected with the internal states of the 
other monkeys (as well as other of its own internal states) as mediated by their behaviors. 
Robert Brandom (1994, 2000) is the current champion of this conception of intentionality. 
The amalgamated account outlined in the text could readily incorporate such social factors. 
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information with this unusual efficient cause. Accordingly, pace the Church-
lands, the internal inferential economy of the organism will operate in the 
same way it does when the usual thing is present and acting on its sense 
organs. This is a commonsensical and realist analysis of how failure of refer-
ence occurs in perception (and as Fodor insists, apparently in spite of his 
methodological solipsism, must be basically correct). It can be deployed to 
explain hallucination, the distinction between delusion and hallucination, 
and the distinction between failures of reference that are known to the agent 
and those that are not. Nevertheless, it can also be deployed to highlight one 
critical inadequacy of this amalgamation of the various conditions of repre-
sentation. 
A visual hallucination seems so real because that which one "sees" is seen 
as causing one to see it, i.e., the representation has the same direction of fit 
that occurs in veridical seeing. Yet according to the amalgamated naturalistic 
conception of representation outlined above, an hallucinatory sighting is only 
a state of the organism that would have high mutual information with some 
external state of affairs that would normally cause it and on the basis of which 
the organism would behave more or less adaptively with respect to the state of 
affairs, if the state of affairs actually obtained (this is the crux of Loewer's, 
1987, criticism ofDretske's account; see also Fodor, 1984, and Searle, 1998, p. 
91 ). What is missing is precisely direction of fit. The amalgamated account of 
intentionality fails to account for that which makes a state carried in the 
organism be as an other thing. Perceptions intend the things that cause them, 
or are about that which causes them, as that which causes them. Yet the consoli-
dated explication of the nature of intentionality in no way accommodates this 
essential aspect of referring. There is no feature of the state of an organism -
which is caused by some thing in the surroundings of the organism and which 
has high mutual information with that thing, etc. - which renders the state 
in itself to be that other thing causing the very state. 
This lacuna vitiates not only the account of veridical perception, but also 
non-veridical perception. Macbeth is hallucinating, but his seeing has direc-
tion of fit in that he sees the dagger as causing him to see it. Furthermore, 
even though he knows that no dagger is really there to cause his seeing of a 
dagger, that knowledge does not change his perception, he still sees the dagger 
as the cause of his seeing of the dagger. And that is why he is so confused -
normally when he sees a weapon, his seeing of the weapon is caused by the 
weapon he sees. In the abnormal case, and in spite of his efforts to shake it off, 
he still sees the dagger as the cause of his seeing it. In order for a perceptual 
mental state to represent a thing in this way, it must represent the thing as 
causing the representation of it. Direction of fit must be built into, so to 
speak, the representation. Thus, the consolidated account of intentionality 
needs to be appended to account for direction of fit (in perception) as follows: 
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A state of an organism is about a thing if and only if high mutual information obtains 
between the state and the thing, and between that state and the relation between (the 
activity that produces) the state and the thing that causes it and the state leads to further 
inner states of the organism that in turn lead it to behave adaptively with respect to 
the thing. 
Mental activity can bring about this additional isomorphism or high mutual 
information if it produces a mental object the components of which are 
related to each other in the same way in which the real extra-mental entity 
is related to the mental act that it causes. The next section of the paper 
explicates how a perceptual representation can enjoy high mutual informa-
tion or be isomorphic with the relation between itself and its very cause. In 
other words, it explains how direction of fit obtains in perception. 
The Modeling of Causality in the Association of Sensations 
The perception of one extra-mental entity as causing a change in some 
other extra-mental thing requires, at the least, that the sensations caused by 
each thing be related in the proper manner (association by constant con-
junction or concomitant variation, etc.). In the same way, the perception of 
a thing as causing its very own perception requires that the different types of 
sensations caused by the thing be associated in a very specific manner. There 
are three elements in this association pattern that constitute the causal 
aspect in perception. First, the ordering of the sensations parallels the fact 
that the mental state (of perception) is distinct from the extra-mental thing 
(causing that state via its causing the mental activity producing the state). 
Second, this same patterning of sensations parallels the fact that there is a 
causal relation between the thing and the sensations of which the perceptual 
state consists. In short, the pattern replicates a causal form. Third, the struc-
ture of the association models the fact that in this causal relation the extra-
mental thing is the cause and the sensations are the effect. For ease of 
exposition, the explication of these three aspects is restricted to a simple case 
of seeing a thing (in the final section of the paper extrapolations of the 
account are proffered).ll 
Suppose that I look at a small cube held by me at arms length. The cube 
simultaneously causes visual and tactile sensations (two different patterns of 
different types of simple sensory qualities). Furthermore, as I manipulate the 
cube with my hand, both the visual sensations and tactile sensations undergo 
IJ Also for the sake of ease of exposition, the account is formulated in terms of metaphysical 
realism. Nothing in what is described can be used to prove the existence of things indepen-
dent of our experience of them. However, elucidation of the essence of intentionality should 
not be expected to solve the metaphysical and epistemological problem of solipsism. 
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A state of an organism is about a thing if and only if high mutual information obtains 
between the state and the thing, and between that state and the relation between (the 
activity that produces) the state and the thing that causes it and the state leads to further 
inner states of the organism that in turn lead it to behave adaptively with respect to 
the thing. 
Mental activity can bring about this additional isomorphism or high mutual 
information if it produces a mental object the components of which are 
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tion or be isomorphic with the relation between itself and its very cause. In 
other words, it explains how direction of fit obtains in perception. 
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each thing be related in the proper manner (association by constant con-
junction or concomitant variation, etc.). In the same way, the perception of 
a thing as causing its very own perception requires that the different types of 
sensations caused by the thing be associated in a very specific manner. There 
are three elements in this association pattern that constitute the causal 
aspect in perception. First, the ordering of the sensations parallels the fact 
that the mental state (of perception) is distinct from the extra-mental thing 
(causing that state via its causing the mental activity producing the state). 
Second, this same patterning of sensations parallels the fact that there is a 
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exposition, the explication of these three aspects is restricted to a simple case 
of seeing a thing (in the final section of the paper extrapolations of the 
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Suppose that I look at a small cube held by me at arms length. The cube 
simultaneously causes visual and tactile sensations (two different patterns of 
different types of simple sensory qualities). Furthermore, as I manipulate the 
cube with my hand, both the visual sensations and tactile sensations undergo 
IJ Also for the sake of ease of exposition, the account is formulated in terms of metaphysical 
realism. Nothing in what is described can be used to prove the existence of things indepen-
dent of our experience of them. However, elucidation of the essence of intentionality should 
not be expected to solve the metaphysical and epistemological problem of solipsism. 
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change. During these manipulations, tactile sensations T(m,n,o), e.g., 
torque, smoothness, etc., that are caused by the cube come to be associated 
with visual sensations V(m,n,o), e.g., color, shape, etc., that are caused by 
the same cube. Each element of one mass of sensations always occurs to-
gether with an element of the other mass- T(m) always occurs at the same 
time that V(m) occurs, T(n) always occurs with V(n), etc. When one (pat-
tern of) mental activity is associated with another (pattern) in this way then 
the occurrence of one activates or primes for activation the other. In short, a 
mutually conditioned relation is established between the two. 14 
As is evident, associational relations such as these are established between 
patterns of mental activity at different levels of scale. It was just noted that 
the simple or "atomic" sensation of touch T(m) caused by the cube comes to 
be associated with another simple sensation of the same type T(n) and/or of a 
different type V(m). This results in whole masses of sensations of the same and 
different types, all caused by the same thing, being associated- T(m,n,o) is 
linked with V(m,n,o). It is these mutually conditioned masses of sensory 
activity that function as whole units of further mental processes, i.e., the asso-
ciational mass precipitates or primes for activation other mental acts. The 
individual sub-activities that make up the association or stand in the mutu-
ally conditioned relations are not functional units at this higher level of scale 
- they coalesce into a unit that so functions. At any of these levels of scale, 
conditioned relations are built up during periods of time that vary in length 
over the life of the individual organism or over the life of the species (which 
are then inherited as innate dispositions of the sensory capacities). 
To return to the example of the cube held in my hand causing visual and 
tactile sensations, some of these tactile sensations T(a,b,c) are not directly 
associated with any visual sensations and some of the visual sensations 
V(x,y,z) are not directly associated with any tactile sensations. For example, 
many of the pressure sensations caused by the cube are not associated with 
any specific visual sensations and many of the color sensations caused by the 
cube are not associated with specific tactile sensations. There is not a one to 
one correspondence between the elements of each distinct type, T(a) is not 
14 Various articulations of how this mutual conditioning occurs (the "binding problem") have 
been developed over the centuries. Aristotelians account for the unifying of sensory activities 
as due to a specific mental power, the common sense. Empiricists have ascribed it to mechani-
cal associating. Kant argued transcendentally that the unifying of the sensory manifold is ulti-
mately brought about by a synthesizer that transcends possible experience. My account further 
explicates the empiricist analysis. It is pertinent to the Kantian conception of the way in 
which sensuous intuition must be spatially and temporally structured in order to be schematiz-
able by the categories of the understanding (Gordon Nagel, 1983, demonstrates that Kant's 
conception of mental functioning presupposes the empiricist account of association of sensa-
tion). As far as I can tell the neurophysiology of this synthesizing is understood in its rudi-
ments (Baars, 1988; Barker, 1991; Crick and Koch, 1990). 
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associated with V(x) or with V(y) or with V(z), T(b) is not associated with 
V(y), etc. This means that sensations of one type may change while sensa-
tions of the other type remain constant- any of T(a,b,c) may alter with no 
change in any of V(x,y,z) and vice versa. Nonetheless, these independent 
sensations are associated with other sensations of the same type, T(a,b,c) is 
associated with T(m,n,o) and V(x,y,z) is associated with V(m,n,o). It follows 
that in spite of the lack of exact one-to-one correlation between all of the 
visual and tactile elements, the set as a whole of all the associated tactile sen-
sations, T(a,b,c) and T(m,n,o), is closely associated with the set as a whole of 
all the associated visual sensations, V(x,y,z) and V(m,n,o). The combined set 
of all these associated sensations contains a sub-set consisting of visual and 
tactile sensations the elements of which are associated, i.e., T(m,n,o) and 
V(m,n,o), and contains another sub-set consisting of different tactile sensa-
tions T(a,b,c) the elements of which are not so associated with any specific 
visual sensations. 
Now, it is precisely this lack of exact correspondence between all of the 
elements of the two different kinds of associated sensations (which are all 
caused by the extra-mental thing) that parallels the distinction between 
visual sensation and thing causing those sensations. This thing is different 
from the visual sensations that it causes - that is just what "extra-mental" 
means. This means that there is "more to my seeing than meets the eye." 
The parallel to this distinction in the form of the associated sensations is 
simply that there are elements of the set of tactile sensations T(a,b,c) which 
are not associated with distinct elements in the associated set of visual sensa-
tions. There is more to the seeing activity as a whole in the sense that there 
are specific sensations of touch T(a,b,c) that do not correspond specifically 
with visual sensations. 15 To reiterate, the sets of associated visual sensations 
V(x,y,z) and V(m,n,o) are linked with the sets T(a,b,c) and T(m,n,o), but 
the elements of T(a,b,c) are not linked with any specific elements in the 
mass of visual sensations. Of course, this also means that there is more to my 
touching in the sense that there are distinct visual sensations V(x,y,z) that 
are not associated with distinct tactile sensations. If each of the elements in 
the set of all visual sensations were precisely associated with an element in 
the set of all tactile sensations, there would be nothing "more" to either type 
of sensation and they would, in effect, constitute a single sensation. In such a 
case there would be nothing within the sensory mass on which to hang the 
distinction between sensation and thing causing sensation. 
15
This is the basis of the "horizon" of experience in vision. As Husser! (1960) continually 
emphasized, intentionality is such that there is always more to what one experiences than is 
given in any experience (see also Ihde, 1986, esp. chapter seven; Smith and Mcintyre, 1982, 
pp. 197-200). 
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So, in order for a state of associated sensations of one type to be the repre-
sentation of a thing distinct from those sensations, they must be linked as a 
set with a mass of sensations of a different type and there must be a lack of 
exact one-to-one correspondence between elements in the two types. Though 
such a pattern of related sensings parallels the distinction between a thing 
and the sensations that it causes, in order for visual sensations to become 
intentional seeing, they must also be directed upon the thing. A thing seen is 
represented as the cause of its being seen. This means, at the least, that it is 
represented as changing concomitantly with changes in the sensations (it is 
causing). It is not merely that the representation changes concomitantly 
with changes in the real thing, but that the thing and these sensations are 
represented as so changing. This comes about because the associating of visual 
and tactile sensations contains a form found in any causal relation, referred 
to by Mill as "concomitant variation" (Cohen and Nagel, 1934, chapter XIII, 
contains a good discussion of concomitant variation and all of Mill's other 
methods for describing causal relations). 
If I alter the orientation of the cube held in my hand by turning it about 
then both the tactile and visual sensations change - as the thing changes so 
too do the sensations. As noted, there is close association between some of 
these tactile sensations T( m,n,o) and some of these visual sensations 
V(m,n,o). This means, for example, that changes in the torque sensations 
correlate precisely with changes in the visual shape sensations. Other tactile 
sensations caused by the cube, T(a,b,c), do not vary in this associational 
manner with changes in the visual sensations. Nonetheless, those tactile sen-
sations T(a,b,c) are still associated as a set with all the visuals and tactiles 
that are caused by the cube. In other words, though the elements of T(a,b,c) 
are not in mutually conditioned relations with elements of T(m,n,o), those 
two sets of tactiles always occur together and occur with the visuals. Because 
there is this specific concomitant variation within the total set of associated sen-
sations, i.e., between T(m,n,o) and V(m,n,o), and because the causal relation 
is one of concomitant variation, it follows that the internal structure of the 
overall pattern of association [T(m,n,o) and T(a,b,c) with V(m,n,o) and 
V(x,y,z)] has the same structure as a causal relation. In addition, the con-
comitant variation within the overall pattern of associations is the same as 
the concomitant variation between the extra-mental thing and the whole set 
of sensations that the thing causes. Hence, the very form of the associations 
parallels the form of the causal relation that actually obtains between the 
cube and all of the sensations that it causes. If none of the visual sensations 
were associated with tactile sensations that varied concomitantly with it 
then the total pattern of associated sensations could not exemplify this 
causal form and could not represent a thing as causing those sensations. As 
explained in the preceding paragraph, because the total mass of these two 
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types of sensations caused by the cube contains sets of sensations the ele-
ments of which are not associated with elements of other sets, the totality 
exhibits the distinction between thing and sensation. It is because this same 
total mass of sensations contains sub-sets of sensations the elements of which 
are associated and which vary concomitantly, that the totality exhibits the 
causal relation. 
However, no component within the whole associational mass is related to 
any other component as the cause of an effect. This is the problem with all of 
Mill's methods for describing causal relations - none of them suffices to 
identify the cause and the effect in a causal relation. Concomitant variation 
between A and B does not by itself identify A as the cause and B as the 
effect, instead of Bas the cause of A (Cohen and Nagel, op. cit., contains a 
good overview of the limitations of Mill's methods). If the re-presenting or 
reconfiguring of the visual sensations that are caused by the cube was 
directed toward the object of that reconfiguring act as to the effect of that act 
then whatever was seen would appear as brought into being by the very 
activity of seeing. This is exactly how one's own willed bodily movements 
appear - one is aware of them as effectuated by the act of choosing. The 
problem then is to account for the manner in which the associating of visual 
sensations "vectors" those sensations upon a thing as upon their cause. Such 
directing is also constituted in the relations between sets of sensations within 
the mass of associated visual and tactile sensations caused by the extra-
mental thing. Using the cube example, this can be explicated as follows. 
Once again, the extra-mental cube causes visual sensations which come to 
be associated with tactile sensations all of which have been or are being 
caused by the very same thing. Some of these tactile sensations T(a,b,c) are 
not associated in a one-to-one matching with any visual sensations though 
they are always associated as a set with the visual sensations as a whole, i.e., 
With V(x,y,z) and V(m,n,o). It is precisely the relation between these tactile 
sensations T(a,b,c) and those other visual sensations that parallels the rela-
tion between cube as cause and visual sensations as effect. If the (felt) thing 
is not there to cause visual sensation then no visual sensations occur - the 
subject cannot directly cause them to occur. The parallel to this conditional 
relation within the mass of associated sensations is that, if the set of tactile 
sensations T(a,b,c), the elements of which are not in one-to-one association 
With any visual sensations, do not occur then the visual sensations do not 
occur either. The form of the associated sensations [T(a,b,c) with V(x,y,z) 
and V(m,n,o)] then "supports the counterfactual," as it were. It is this simple 
dependency relation between sets of sensations that models the dependency 
relation between sensations and the thing that causes them. The cube in my 
hand causes me to see it, not the cube afar. The thing seen and felt causes the 
seeing of it. 
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Of course, I can see distant things not held in my hands (things not within 
the tactile field). However, this capacity depends on and derives from the 
association of vision with touch. If the things that cause visual sensations 
could not also cause tactile sensations, then none of those things would be 
seen as causing its being seen. 16 
To put this point otherwise, if a thing is seen and not felt then obviously 
there cannot be concomitant variations between visual and tactile sensations 
and when concomitant varying does occur then there is a dependency of the 
visual sensations on the tactile sensations. In this sense then the form of the 
association of sensations is isomorphic with the very direction of the 
cause-effect relation between the extra-mental cause of the sensations and 
those sensations. Accordingly, the thing that is seen and felt is seen as caus-
ing the seeing. 
The whole point of this analysis of perceptual intentionality is that all of 
the features of the relation between the extra-mental thing and the sensa-
tions that it causes that render that relation causal are recapitulated in the rela-
tions between the different types of those sensations. First, the fact that the 
thing is not the same as the sensations that it causes is modeled in the differ-
ence between the tactile and the visual sensations (the cube seen and the 
cube felt, in the example). Second, the efficient causal action of the thing on 
the sense organs is modeled in the concomitant variations between the visual 
sensations and tactile sensations. Third, the dependency of the sensations as 
effect upon the thing as cause is modeled in the dependence of visual sensing 
upon tactile sensing (if the thing is not felt, it is not seen). Because com-
plexes of associations model all this, the subject of those associated sensa-
tions perceives a thing as causing perception of it. When this directing of 
visual sensations upon an object distinct from those sensations is veridical, a 
real extra-mental thing that really is causing those sensations is sighted. In 
misperception, when reference fails, the same complex of associated sensa-
tions occurs, yet it is not in fact triggered or efficiently caused by the extra-
mental thing. This faux state within the organism constitutes a model of a 
causal relation that in fact does not obtain. And this explains why, even 
16This is essentially the point that Locke and Berkeley made apropos the discriminative 
capacities of the blind man upon restoration of his sight. Since his new visual sensations 
would not be associated with his tactile sensations, both claimed that he would be incapable 
of visually distinguishing a cube from a sphere on the basis of distinctions gleaned from his 
tactile discrimination of them. Furthermore, he would not see things as distinct from him and 
as causing his visual sensations (George Berkeley, An Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision, 
sections 92-110, 132, 133 and Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, The First 
Dialogue; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding ll.ix.S; cf. Todes, 2001, 
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when one knows that one is hallucinating, the hallucinated thing still 
appears as causing one to perceive it. In spite of knowing better, the pattern-
ing of sensations maintains an object that is experienced (the difference in 
such a case being that no real thing is thereby perceived)Y 
Three Objections to and One Support for the Account 
First, it might be objected that this analysis of intentionality rules out such 
states in animals and young humans who either do not have the concept of 
causality or have not developed the use of such a concept with which to 
order their sensations. If the experiencing subject of a mental act, that has 
been caused in the subject by some thing in its environs, is incapable of sub-
suming that thing under the category of cause or of understanding the thing 
as the cause of its sensations, then it could not undergo intentional percep-
tion. However, it seems false that animals and children do not intentionally 
perceive their environments, yet they lack the concept of causality appar-
ently required for intentional perception. In response to this objection, it 
should be noted that the same issue arises with respect to our grasp of causal 
relations between things around us in our environs. When I am aware of an 
event causing another I need not explicitly characterize the events as 
causally related, I may just be aware of one event and expect another to 
follow. Such anticipation need not be based on employment of the concept 
of causation. Empiricists will regard contingent association of sensations as 
fully accounting for our awareness of causality between things. Rationalists 
will take the contingent association of sensations to be merely a pre-condi-
tion of our awareness of causality, which involves a sense of necessity in the 
connection between a cause and its effect. Associated sensations have to be 
further framed in or schematized under the concept of cause in order for us to 
grasp a causal relation. This schematizing adds necessity to a relation already 
established by association. So, the question for this analysis of intentionality 
17
This internalist analysis differs from the Churchlands' internalist functional account because 
the object directedness of a mental state is not a matter of its relations to other mental states 
on the same level of functional scale. Seeing is not intentional simply because it leads to 
other mental activities downstream or is caused by other mental activities upstream from it. 
In fact, it is the intentionality of the seeing that precipitates these other mental events. 
Object directedness arises in concatenations of mental activities which are at lower levels of 
functional scale and which are not themselves intentional. In other words, visual sensations 
and tactile sensations are not about anything distinct from themselves until they combine 
properly. The analysis is externalist because, pace Dretske and Fodor, a pattern of sensations 
bssociated in this manner corresponds to an extra-mental thing and to the causal relation 
htween that thing and those associations (and, pace Millikan, that associational pattern leads 
t e organism to behave adaptively with respect to that thing). 
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is whether or not more needs to be added to the association of sensations in 
order to make the form of that associating the same as the form of a causal 
relation. If more is needed, then sensations associated in the manner previ-
ously described would have to be subsumed under a category of cause in order 
for them to be intentionally directed upon their cause. In this case only crea-
tures with the concept would be capable of intentional awareness of their 
environment (i.e., perception). However, sensations would still have to be 
properly associated in order to be so subsumed (that is Gordon Nagel's point 
about Kant's conception, see footnote 14 ). If nothing more must be added to 
the complex associations of sensations to produce awareness of causality then 
creatures without the schema of cause would possess intentional awareness of 
their environment. Hence, under either a rationalist or empiricist analysis, 
perceptual intentionality requires the association of sensations articulated in 
the previous section. 18 
Second, it could be objected that this account simply begs the whole ques-
tion. In the example, touching the cube has an intentionality of its own- I 
touch and feel the cube. The cube feels as if it is causing me to feel as I do. If 
the intentionality of seeing the cube depends on the referentiality of touch 
then where did the intentionality of touching come from? In response to this 
objection it must be pointed out that the object-directedness of touch is built 
up by the association of sensations in the very same way as in the case of 
vision. I have access to whatever I touch from a multiplicity of approaches. I 
can touch the cube with this hand or with that or can make the cube touch 
various parts of my body, etc. These sensings can be associated into com-
plexes, the structure of which parallels the distinction between thing and 
sensation and the causal relation between them. In this way tactile sensings, 
too, become intentional or representational. 
Third, it could be objected that the construal is quite at odds with the phe-
nomenology of vision. If visual and tactile sensations must be associated in 
this manner in order to give intentionality to visual sensation, then, when I 
see, I should feel too. Yet surely I do not have tactile sensations when I see 
things (unless there is something unusual about my "common sense" power 
as occurs in the synaesthesias). The immediate response to this objection is 
that this is exactly how we see things and the purported flaw in the analysis 
1
"Adult humans who reflect upon their own acts of perception can make themselves explicitly 
aware of the causal form contained therein. It is actually possible to de-intentionalize, so to 
speak, one's perceptions by such acts of reflection. For instance, an artist may focus on a scene 
as a two-dimensional array of color shapes, lacking depth. By an effort of attention the subject 
of the sensations is sundering the associational relations between masses of visual and tactile 
sensations. The result is that visual sensations do not appear as a (felt) thing. This is more dif· 
ficult to do if there is motion within the visual scene and, especially, if those motions are felt 
as being caused by the introspecting subject. 
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actually supports it. The thing I see, I see as at a distance from myself, e.g., I 
see the cube as if I could reach out and grab it, I see the house as if I could 
walk up to it, I see the landscape as if I could walk in to it, etc. In each case, 
what is seen is associated with what has been sensed by touch. If these were 
not so correlated, I could not have an experience in which my seeing was dis-
tinguished from the thing sighted. 
Support for this analysis of perceptual intentionality as a matter of com-
plex combinations of different types of sensation comes from consideration of 
sense modalities that operate independently of other sense modalities. Kant 
claimed that seeing is the "most objective" of the senses, i.e., gives the most 
information about the thing, whereas tasting and smelling are the least 
objective and give information primarily about the state of the sensory organ 
(Kant 1798/1978, Book I, Sections 19 and 20, pp. 43-44). This difference in 
measure of objectivity (object directedness) obtains because in human beings 
odor and taste sensations are not systematically or consistently associated 
with other sensations whereas visual sensations are so associated with other 
types of sensations, especially with the tactile. This point can be roughly 
generalized: sensations lack reference to an object to the degree they lack 
association with other types of sensations. Or, to put it positively, sensations 
have intentionality proportionate to their association with sensations of dif-
ferent types. Hence, though color sensations are peculiar to vision, such sen-
sations are caused by features of things (i.e., patterns on surfaces spread out 
in space) that also often cause patterns of tactile sensations. Because of such 
associations, sensations of color do possess a measure of directedness. The 
generalization jibes with the traditional employment in epistemology of the 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities (e.g., by Galileo and by 
Berkeley in his character "Hylas"). The common Renaissance epistemologi-
cal stance was that only the primary qualities of experience or common sen-
sibles (motion, shape, size, etc.) were "real" properties of extra-mental things. 
The secondary qualities of experience or special sensibles (color, tone, 
warmth, etc.) were merely "subjective" features of our experience, though 
caused by the real properties of things. This is correct in the sense that the 
special sensibles/secondary qualities come to be intentional or possess objec-
tive reference only if associated into complexes with common sensibles/ 
primary qualities (A.D. Smith, 1990). However, the generalization is only 
rough since tactile sensations, for example, can acquire a measure of object 
directedness simply by being appropriately associated with other tactile sen-
sations. Furthermore, the simple fact that some feature of a thing stimulates 
more than one type of sensory mode does not by itself make the resultant 
sensations refer beyond themselves. Though surfaces spread in space stimu-
late both the tactile and visual sense organs of human beings, the mere stim-
ulation of both does not constitute directedness upon a thing for either type 
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of sensation. What is critical for intentionality is that the sensations be asso-
ciated in the manner described in the previous section. 
The Intentionality of Other Types of Mental Activity 
This causal account of intentionality applies most evidently in cases of 
veridical perception in which the intentional relation obtains between a 
state of mind (or brain) and some physical thing in the environment which 
is acting on that mind via sense organs. However, any mental act will be 
about something if it results in a state that has the same internal (and exter-
nal) relational characteristics as those that obtain among the sensations con-
stituting perceptual intentionality. Specifically, a state that results from 
mental activity will be about some thing distinct from the state if ( 1) the 
state's internal structure is formally isomorphic with that thing, (2) the state 
is efficiently caused by that thing, and (3) the state's internal structure is for-
mally correspondent to that very causal relationship between the thing and 
that mental activity. This final condition requires that the state be internally 
formed in way that models the distinction between extra-mental entity and 
mental activity, the concomitant variance between these and the depen-
dency of one upon the other. 
This "causal-informational correspondence" account of intentionality is 
applicable to both passive and active operations of the mind. The former 
involve the stimulation of a mental capacity (a passive power to be affected) 
as in perceiving. The latter involve the activation of a mental ability (an 
active power to effectuate), as in choosing. In either of these basic types of 
intentional mental operation, direction of fit is brought about by the associa-
tion of the operation with other operations in a manner that corresponds to 
the causal relation between the thing and the operations that are caused by 
the thing (as in undergoings or passions) or that corresponds to the opera-
tions and the thing caused by those operations (as in actions, mental or phys-
ical). Different schools of thought concerning the fundamental nature of the 
mind emphasize differently its active or passive character: empiricists tend to 
emphasize the passive, receptive character of the mind whereas rationalists 
tend to emphasize the active, constituting character of the mental. 
Furthermore, these different emphases enter into various combinations with 
fundamental epistemologies and ontologies of mind. 
Epistemological theories range between two extremes. At one end is classi-
cal realism which is the view that, most of the time, humans are aware of a 
reality that exists independently of their consciousness of it. At the other 
extreme is subjectivist anti-realism, which is the view that the content of 
reality is exhausted by what appears in/to human consciousness. Within real-
ist epistemologies then, a passive mental state intends a thing which is other 
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than it if (1) the state corresponds to the thing, (2) the mental activity 
which brings about the state is caused by the thing, and (3) the state's inter-
nal structure parallels the causal relation from thing to state. An active 
mental state intends an extra-mental thing (e.g., an artifact to be made or a 
behavior to be displayed) if (1) the state corresponds to the thing, (2) the 
mental act which produces the state thereby causes that thing, and (3) the 
state's internal structure parallels that causal relation from state to thing. 
According to extreme anti-realist epistemologies, there is no thing that 
exists independently of the mental state that causes it or is caused by it, with 
which it is isomorphic, etc. Therefore, within these epistemologies a state is 
intentional only in the sense that its internal structure parallels the relation 
between itself and the activity that produces it. Anti-realism is simply the 
denial that intentional states are related to an extra-mental realm of things 
or to any relations between such states and extra-mental things. 
Ontological conceptions of mind also vary between extremes. At one 
extreme is the theory of absolute idealism - all that exists, is ideational or 
mental in nature. At the other extreme is materialism - all that exists, is 
material or physical in nature. According to idealist ontologies, our minds 
are noetic beings and are acted upon and/or act on entities that enjoy noetic 
being. Within idealistic realism the things with which our minds interact are 
extra-mental noetic entities, whereas within idealistic anti-realism mental 
objects only interact with other mental objects. In either version of idealism, 
if a mental act is about some such abstract entity then the act is caused by the 
entity or causes it, the act is structured in a manner that is correspondent to 
the entity and the structure of the act is correspondent to that very causal 
relation. Materialist ontologies countenance only physical things. Accordingly, 
our minds are conceived as physical entities (systems of nerve cells) that only 
interact with physical things. In materialistic realism such things are extra-
cranial material entities and in materialistic anti-realism they are always only 
material intra-cranial states (Jerry Fodor?). In either version of materialism, a 
physical act is about a physical thing (a mental act is intentional) only if the 
act formally corresponds with the thing, causes it/is caused by it, and formally 
corresponds to the causal relation itself between the act and the thing. 
The "causal-informational correspondence" account of intentionality is 
neutral with respect to these epistemological and ontological conceptions. If 
acts of mind can be directed upon entities with unusual ontological status 
then that entails that our minds are causally related with unusual realms. If 
mental acts do not relate to things existing outside of the mind then the 
intentionality of a mental act is only the relation between the act and the 
state that it brings about. Thus, extrapolation of this basic account of inten-
tionality to mental activities other than perception does not entail specific 
metaphysical or epistemological commitments. 
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metaphysical or epistemological commitments. 
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On the Temporal Continuity of Human Consciousness: 
Is James's Firsthand Description, After All, "Inept"? 
Thomas Natsoulas 
University of California, Davis 
Contrary to James's emphasis on the sensible continuity of each personal conscious-
ness, our purported "stream," as it presents itself to us, is not accurately described as 
having a flowing temporal structure; thus Strawson has argued based on how he finds 
his own consciousness to be. Accordingly, qua object of inner awareness, our con-
sciousness is best characterized as constituted successively by pulses of consciousness 
separated in time, one from the next, by a momentary state of complete unconscious-
ness. It seems at times that one's consciousness is flowing along, but this is an illusion 
(a) that is owed to taking continuities of content, across pulses, for continuity in the 
process itself of consciousness, and (b) that can be overcome by the proper mode of 
reflection upon one's consciousness as it is taking place. With reference to James's 
original account and to commentaries from Dainton and from Tye on Strawson's 
claims, the present article examines the latter claims, and proposes that Strawson errs 
in how he gives expression to what he observes firsthand with respect to his conscious-
ness. His own introspective reports indicate that what he describes to be states of com-
plete unconsciousness that directly precede and follow each of his conscious thoughts, 
are actually totally qualified states of consciousness and so they are not stoppages in 
the flow of his consciousness. Also, Strawson's special mode of reflection - which he 
labels "attentive" and speaks of as one's "reflecting very hard" - likely works not to 
reveal his consciousness to him but, rather, to prevent his apprehending that "phe-
nomenal background," (a) which is there, perhaps always, while he is in the general 
state that we call "awakeness" and (b) of which each of his states of consciousness par-
tially consists, including the purported states of complete unconsciousness he truly 
apprehends but misdescribes. 
Is William James's well-known portrayal of consciousness from the first-
person perspective, an "inept" contribution to our understanding? So a present-
day critic has objected. A philosopher of mind of some note, Strawson 
( 1997) has come to the following startling conclusion. Contrary to the 
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